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Introduction
This article looks at the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the context 
of the European Union’s Eastern neighbours 
– Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The article 
reflects on the May 2011 Communication 
drafted by the European Commission and 
High Representative ‘A New Response to a 
Changing Neighbourhood’, which reflects 
a longstanding debate on the need to refine 
ENP, boost its political and economic offer, 
provide better targeted funding and deliver 
a more differentiated policy.1  
In terms of basic political and economic 
aspects of ENP the Communication 
highlights the following: Building ‘deep 
democracy’ as a prerequisite for further 
cooperation between ENP partners 
and the EU.  This reflects a desire to re-
launch the drive for good governance in 
the region and tackle corruption.  In this 
context the communication promotes the 
need for more partnership with societies 
and also supports the idea of creating a 
‘European Endowment for Democracy’. 
The Communication also restates trade 
and creation of DCFTAs as lynchpins of 
economic cooperation between the Eastern 
neighbours and the EU and expresses 
disappointment over consistently derisory 
results in this sector.  The Communication 
recognises the high demands placed on 
ENP partners in DCFTA negotiations 
and therefore talks about various interim 
solutions and concessions to enhance 
trade.2 The document goes on to stress the 
enabling functions of the Lisbon Treaty 
and especially the way in which its new 
provisions can ensure better coordination 
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for the EU to pursue its foreign and security 
objectives in the neighbourhood.    
Conditionality as a means to foster 
democracy in ENP states through rewards 
and in turn to deny cooperation and EU 
funding for countries failing to deliver is a 
pronounced feature in the Communication. 
The more confident use of conditionality 
in ENP implementation potentially brings 
some substance to the ‘more for more’ 
principle.  Significant emphasis is placed on 
mobility; by easing barriers for ENP citizens 
to work, study or visit EU states.  This is seen 
as key to ENP’s goal of nurturing people to 
people contacts, to benefit EU and ENP 
states economic and labour market needs 
and to curb irregular migration.  The 
Communication envisages substantial steps 
forwards in this domain, recognising the 
claim made already in the 2007 Strategy 
Paper that ‘Mobility is in itself a key foreign 
policy priority, as this is the prism through 
which the citizens of partner countries 
perceive the EU.’3 This communication 
positively views the rolling out of further 
visa facilitation dialogues and development 
of more ‘Mobility Partnerships’ to facilitate 
the well-managed movement of people.4  
Significantly, the Communication 
promotes regional partnerships ‘(…) 
by fostering regional cooperation and 
developing regional synergies and responses 
to the specific geographical, economic and 
social challenges of each region’.5 This is 
the first time that such a bold statement has 
emerged on the need to differentiate more 
boldly between the East and the South. The 
Eastern Partnership is regarded as a success, 
which could be emulated in the South. 
Relating to this is a call for more resources 
to be dedicated to areas and districts that lie 
beyond national capitals, including border 
regions. The communication recognises 
that such areas still suffer from the negative 
effects of the enlargement of the EU 
(something that ENP was supposed to help 
overcome), specifically the construction 
of the Schengen border and subsequent 
curtailment of cross-border socio-economic 
activities. 
The Communication also proposes 
more money and a revamp of the ENP 
financing method.  An examination of the 
Action Planning process is called for, to 
make timetables and deliverables more 
precise and focused on fewer priorities. 
This aims to satisfy partner’s expectations 
that the EU should reward progress more 
speedily and equally, to allow the EU to 
detect back sliding from ENP states.
Finally, the Communication gives a nod 
to the European identities and aspirations 
vis a vis the EU of some of the Eastern 
neighbours by stating that the Eastern 
Partnership is based on the same principles 
of freedom, democracy, respect for human 
rights and the rule of law that are ‘enshrined 
in Article 2 of the European Union Treaty 
and on which articles 8 and 49 are based’.6
Overall, the Communication makes 
a welcome contribution to the ongoing 
debate, but of course it does not constitute 
an instant recipe for a new ENP.  History 
shows that there is a always a gap between 
the far-reaching ambitions of Commission-
led papers and what actually gets 
implemented.  Input from EU member states, 
changing assessments of the performance 
3 Communication from the Commission A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy Brussels, 05/12/2007 COM(2007) 
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of ENP countries and budgetary contexts 
temper initial perspectives. Nevertheless, 
this Communication gives a sense of the 
shape of things to come.  
This article analyses the implementation 
of ENP vis-a-vis Moldova, Ukraine and 
Belarus (though the latter is not a full member 
of ENP).  It asks what has been achieved so 
far and how should the policy be changed 
to better suit the job in hand.  The article 
pursues this by looking at the broad theme 
of democracy and good governance as the 
‘big picture’, alongside a consideration of 
the subject of mobility.  With regards to the 
latter EU policy has aimed at: establishing 
negotiations between member states 
and ENP countries on ways to simplify / 
cheapen Visa acquisition for ENP citizens 
to enter the EU; involving, inter alia, Visa 
Facilitation dialogues, implementation 
of the EU Visa Code, reducing national 
variations in the issuing/refusal of Visas for 
ENP citizens and setting up Common Visa 
Application Centres in ENP-states (such as 
that in Moldova); establishing Re-Admission 
Agreements between ENP countries and 
EU states, which allow for the return of ENP 
citizens and other third country nationals, if 
they enter the EU irregularly;  modernizing 
the border guard services of ENP states, 
including the adoption of the nascent EU 
Integrated Border Management model; 
calling for better demarcation of national 
borders in the Eastern neighbourhood 
and the use of proper national passports 
(rather than internal CIS travel documents); 
efforts at improving migration management 
capabilities and laws in ENP states.
The Evolution of European 
Neighbourhood Policy
With the 2004 enlargement in sight, 
the Commission launched its ‘Wider 
Europe: A New Framework for Relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ 
Communication in March 2003, which 
sketched out the substance of a potentially 
bold new policy towards the soon to be 
neighbours.  The subsequent European 
Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper was 
released shortly after the accession of ten 
new member states into the EU and saw 
that: 
The European Neighbourhood Policy’s 
vision involves a ring of countries, 
sharing the EU’s fundamental values 
and objectives, drawn into an 
increasingly close relationship, going 
beyond co-operation to involve a 
significant measure of economic and 
political integration. This will bring 
enormous gains to all involved in terms 
of increased stability, security and 
well being. (…). The next step could 
consist in the negotiation of European 
Neighbourhood Agreements, to replace 
the present generation of bilateral 
agreements (…).7
Coincident with the 2004 Strategy 
Paper the Commission published a first 
set of Country Reports (CR), including 
those on Moldova and Ukraine.  Both 
CRs stressed a lack of good governance 
and pervading corruption as roots of 
the problem.  Subsequent Action Plans 
highlighted the jobs to be done this area. 
7 Brussels, 12.5.2004 COM(2004) 373 final communication from the Commission




Ukraine’s CR pointed to the shaky state of 
democracy and lack of good governance.8 
Judicial reform and efficiency was seen as 
lacking, with strong tendencies persisting 
for corruption and a general vulnerability 
of the judiciary to ‘political interference’. 
The Country Report on Moldova cited 
that in the main, legal frameworks for 
democratic elections existed, and noted 
that elections have been judged as free and 
fair, albeit with irregularities, for example 
in the secrecy of voting, intimidation of 
opposition candidates, media bias and 
so on.9 Like in Ukraine, corruption was 
viewed as entrenched and worsened by 
an inefficient judicial system. The CR cited 
low ethical and professional standards 
of public functionaries as contributing to 
this problem. The extent and entrenched 
nature of poverty was also seen as a strong 
contributing factor in this regard.  The CR 
noted the sizeable negative economic and 
political implications stemming from the 
Transdnistria situation for the Moldovan 
state and modernisation efforts.  This very 
brief synopsis shows ENP’s emphasis 
on the installation of the rule of law and 
establishment of good governance, with 
a focus upon tackling corruption, civil 
service reform and securing positive 
electoral outcomes in line with OSCE and 
international standards. 
The task of assessing the implementation 
of ENP in Belarus is not the same as it is for 
Ukraine and Moldova.  Although Belarus 
is a recipient of ENPI funds, amongst other 
streams, there is still no PCA in place and 
subsequently there is no Action Plan by 
which to measure implementation and to 
gauge the effects of the EU in the same way 
as ENP states. The ENPI country strategy 
paper for Belarus sees that: ‘The long-term 
goal of the EU is for Belarus to become a 
democratic, stable, reliable, and increasingly 
prosperous partner with which the enlarged 
EU will share not only common borders but 
also a common agenda driven by shared 
values’.10 EU policy remains on a two-
track approach after the December 2010 
elections. The soundings of a more robust 
stance from the EU can be witnessed in an 
Op Ed. written by the Foreign Ministers of 
Sweden, Germany, the Czech Republic 
and Poland, in which they argued: ‘We 
must now deepen our engagement with the 
democrats of Belarus and those inside the 
government who disapprove of the fateful 
turn their country has taken. They must not 
be abandoned or betrayed as their country 
enters what might be a new dark era.11
Over time ENP has been reconceived, 
grown in terms of membership and 
ostensibly ‘strengthened’, though the 
basic formula and procedure, namely 
the producing of country reports by the 
Commission, drafting of Action Plans by the 
Commission (in consultation with the ENP 
partner), monitored by annual progress 
reports delivered on country, sectoral 
as well as ‘overall’ bases has remained 
basically in tact.  The ‘strengthening’ of 
ENP has arguably been manifest most 
8 Commission Staff Working Paper, European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report Ukraine (COM (2004) 373 final) 
Brussels 12.5.2004, SEC (2004) 566, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/ukraine_enp_country_
report_2004_en.pdf.
9 Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 12.5.2004 SEC(2004) 567 Commission Staff Working Paper 
European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/moldova_enp_
country_report_2004_en.pdf. 
10 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Belarus Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative 
Programme 2007-2011 p.5, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_belarus_en.pdf.
11 Letter by Ministers of Foreign Affairs - Carl Bildt, Karel Schwarzenberg, Radek Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle, 
Lukashenko the Loser, The New York Times, 23 December 2010.
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clearly in the EU’s offer of a new generation 
of Association Agreements, replete with 
negotiations for DCFTAs for the Eastern 
neighbours, beginning with Ukraine and 
now Moldova.  
Of course, the most significant 
development in this context has been the 
Eastern Partnership, which by definition 
stresses the notion of differentiation and 
importance of regionally-relevant policies 
and opportunities for the six partner 
states. Inaugurated in May 2009, EaP was 
driven by the perceived need to provide a 
dedicated framework to enhance relations 
with the Eastern partners.  On the face of 
it EaP offers a number of innovations, both 
of a procedural and substantive nature. 
The initiative gains profile via biennial EaP 
summits, the first of which was held in 
Prague in 2009. The structure of EaP also 
aims to bring coherence and attention to 
EU endeavours through thematic platforms: 
(i) Democracy and Good Governance (ii) 
Energy Security (iii) Economic integration 
and convergence with the EU and (iv) 
People to People Contacts. Flagship 
Initiatives also represent EaP’s ‘cherry on 
the cake’ approach in the areas of Integrated 
Border Management (ii) Regional Energy 
Markets, energy efficiency and renewable 
energy (iii) SMEs (iv) Environment Policy 
(v) Diversification of the supply of energy 
(vi) Preparedness and Responses to natural 
and manmade disasters. Beyond this, EaP 
tries to reach the parts that ENP has not via 
the EURONEST parliamentary assembly, an 
assembly of regional and local authorities 
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The State of the Neighbourhood
Since Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
were constituent parts of the Soviet Union 
they had roughly comparable starting 
points to develop their relations with the EU 
post-independence. Crucially, however, 
their paths of political and economic 
development, as well as their relations with 
the EU, diversified over the course of the 
subsequent twenty years. From a current 
vantage point, relations between the EU and 
Belarusian government rest upon mutual 
disavowal, whilst the position of top player 
in the region, which seemed to belong 
irrevocably to Ukraine, has arguably been 
stolen by Moldova. Though Moldova is still 
behind Ukraine in terms of negotiating an 
Association Agreement, there is a palpable 
sense in Brussels that Moldova has become 
a model ENP-student by virtue of its pro-
active reforms across a range of policy 
areas, moves underpinned by a seemingly 
strong pro-EU domestic consensus.
What in general terms can be said about 
the implementation of ENP in the three 
target countries? What ‘state’ are the three 
neighbours in some five years down the 
line? 
Significant Wealth Gaps Persists 
The region is still profoundly poorer 
than the EU. The wealth gap exceeds that 
which existed between the EU and Central 
European states in the 1990s; Moldova’s 
GDP per capita equals only 9% of the 
average EU level, with figures for Belarus 
and Ukraine equalling 43% and 21% 
respectively.
Innovation Describe the 
ways in which 
the EU and 
neighbours 
can profit from 
enlargement.
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12 All figures, unless otherwise stated, come from 
‘Ukraine’  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf  
‘Moldova’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113419.pdf 
‘Belarus’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113351.pdf. 
13 A jump to 37.9% is predicted for 2010Q3‘Ukraine, Main Economic Indicators’  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf. 
14  27.5% for 2010Q3 ‘Ukraine, Main Economic Indicators’  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf. 
15 Projected 56% in 2010Q3.
16 Projected in 2010Q3.
17 Projected 21.8% in 2010Q3.
18 Projected 26.3% in 2010Q3.
19 Katarzyna Pelczynska Nalecz (2011) ‘Integration or Imitation? EU Policy towards its Eastern Neighbours’ OSW 
Studies, Warsaw, April 2011Pp.19-21.
Ukraine Moldova Belarus
GDP per capita 
Euros 201012
2,265 1,133 4,229
Trade Ukraine’s Trade Balance 
with EU27
EU share of total 
imports in 2009: 34%.13 
EU share of total exports 
30.2% 2005 – 24% 
2009.14
Moldova’s Trade Balance 
with EU27
EU share of total imports 
in 2009: 43.6%.15
EU share of total exports
38.7% 2005 - 52.4% 
2009.16
Belarus’ Trade Balance 
with EU27
EU share of total 
imports in 2009: 23%.17 
EU share of total exports
44.7% 2005 – 43.8% 
2009.18
Table: GDP and Trade vis a vis the EU
Minsk is apparently the regional leader 
in terms of playing economic catch-up 
with the EU, a situation explained though 
by Russian economic support. This stands 
in contrast to the apparent sluggish pace 
of change in Ukraine and Moldova where 
growth towards EU standards of wealth 
stand at 3% and 2% respectively.19  This 
is interesting, because of all the Eastern 
neighbours (including the South Caucasus) 
the two more advanced ENP states have 
actually experienced the slowest economic 
growth vis a vis EU standards.  In this 
context the question is whether DCFTAs 
can make a difference. 
Despite some changes over recent years 
in the proportion of Ukrainian exports 
destined for EU markets, the EU27 remains 
Ukraine’s biggest single trading partner 
(29.3% of Ukrainian trade in 2009 was 
with the EU27), followed by Russia (25.4%) 
and then China, Kazakhstan and Turkey. 
Of course, if looked at another way, if all 
Commonwealth of Independent States are 
added together, the CIS grouping becomes 
the most significant trade partner for. 
Meanwhile, Moldova is the only one of the 
three states that has experienced marked 
growth in its export activity to the EU. In 
2009 46.1% of Moldovan trade activity was 
with the EU27, compared with 14.5% with 
Russia. Belarus presents a different picture 
for reasons already noted; Russia remains 
the major trade partner, above EU27 
(47.2% and 31.0% of Belarusian trade is 
conducted with these entities respectively).
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Fragile Democracies and Foreign 
Policies in Flux
 
The states in the EU’s eastern 
neighbourhood are fragile democracies. 
Crucially, the democratic footing of the 
newly independent states in the 1990’s 
was thwarted by protracted economic 
problems and instability associated 
with post-communist transformations, 
ambiguous relations with Russia and in the 
case of Moldova by territorial conflict. This 
situation was not helped by the lack of a 
strategic foreign policy from the EU, which 
arguably let the region languish for at least a 
decade, which also shaped current foreign 
policies and led to a state of play where 
these three countries are caught, in varying 
degrees and intensities, between Russian 
and EU overtures.
20 See Sabine Fischer ‘Has the EU Lost Ukraine?’, EUISS Analysis, February 2010, available at: 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Has_the_EU_lost_Ukraine.pdf.




Viktor Yanukovych won 
the 2010 Presidential 
elections, which were 
deemed free and fair.20 
Subsequently, however, 
authoritarian tendencies 
have returned and the 
legacy of the Orange 
Revolution seems to have 
evaporated.
MOLDOVA
After a long period of post-
communist authoritarian 
rule, punctuated by 
violent anti-government 
protests and stalemate 
in the electoral process 
in 2009/10 the Alliance 
for European Integration 
is now in power and 
a decisive focus on 




Lukashenko has been 
in power since 1994. 
The Presidential office 
controls all political 
institutions, and the 
electoral process. 
Lukashenko won the 
Presidential elections 
in December 2010 
for the fourth time 
with a result of 80%21
Appraisal of 
Democracy
Ukraine is a democracy, 
but does not function 
as one. The uneven 
application of the rule of 
law and weak judiciaries 
mean that the political 
system is corrupted for 
political / economic gain. 
Opposition forces exist in 
Ukraine, though as seen in 
the course of the demise 
of the Orange Revolution 
they are often disparate at 
steering the country in a 
democratic direction.
Democracy seems to have 
taken hold in Moldova 
and has brought a pro-
European alliance to 
power. This rosy state of 
affairs should not be taken 
for granted, since the rule 
of law remains patchy 
and corruption pervades. 
The static situation in 
Transdnistria hampers 
fundamental reform and 
state-building. 
Despite some modest 
peaks in EU-Belarus 
relations over the 
past twenty years, the 
political system has 
not changed, indeed 
authoritarianism 
and repression of 
opposition forces has 
worsened over the 
course of the past year.
Table:  Governance and Democracy 
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The continued fragility of democracy in 
this region is manifest in elections which 
more often than not do not meet basic 
international standards, corruption remains 
endemic and a real block to processes 
of modernisation and effectiveness of 
opposition forces. Divisions persist 
between reform versus conservative forces; 
Westernisers and pro-Europeans versus pro-
Russian elites and also between different 
ethnic, regional or language groups to 
greater or lesser extents. Thus on key 
political questions the countries in the EU’s 
Eastern neighbourhood present quite a 
different picture than East Central European 
states did prior to EU membership. Already 
by the early 1990’s states like Poland and 
Hungary had become democracies, based 
on largely uncontested territorial integrity, 
clear national identities and on a course to 
‘return to Europe’.
Table: The Conduct of Elections
Ukraine – Presidential Elections January/February 2010
The ‘free and fair’ elections of 2006 were viewed as the democratic breakthrough in Ukraine. 
Four years later observers looked at the Presidential election of January 2010 for confirmation 
that democracy had taken firm root. Observers were not disappointed in this respect; the 
OSCE/ODIHR mission report saw that the election ‘met most OSCE commitments and other 
international standards for democratic elections and consolidated progress achieved since 
2004’, though it was noted that the legal electoral framework needed to be reviewed.22 
Moldova – Parliamentary Elections November 2010
Through much of 2009 and 2010 Moldova was locked in a political stalemate after Parliament 
was unable to elect a new President. This deadlock incited street-violence which was met with 
a government clampdown and threatened to put into relapse Moldova’s relations with the EU. 
Early Parliamentary elections were subsequently held in late November 2010. In general the 
conduct of the election was lauded by international observers, as meeting ‘most OSCE and 
Council of Europe commitments’. The principle negative comment was the need to ‘strengthen 
public confidence in the democratic process’.23
Belarus – Presidential Elections December 2010
The EU viewed the election of December 2010 a failure. The OSCE noted that the actual voting 
process was good, but thereafter the situation deteriorated. The vote counting was judged as 
‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ in almost half of the polling stations, carried out in an intransparent manner, 
with access by observers curtailed. Prior to the election Lukashenko was given the lion’s share 
of airtime for campaigning, coverage of other candidates in the media was given mostly in a 
negative light.24 It was reported that on election day some major internet sights were blocked 
alongside some social networking channels and opposition websites. In the course of the day a 
number of detentions, arrests and kidnappings were made.
22 Ukraine Presidential Election 17 January and 7 February 2010.  OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final 
Report, Warsaw 28 April 2010.
23 Republic of Moldova Early Parliamentary Elections 28 November. 2010 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission 
Final Report 26 January 2011. 
24 International Election Observation Republic of Belarus – Presidential Election 19 December 2010,  OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.
Studies, Warsaw, April 2011Pp.19-21.
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Though the methodology of indicators 
relating to corruption levels may be open to 
criticism, they do relate a palpable lack of 
change in the governance area in the region, 
as detailed below. As was hinted at in ENP 
progress reports, and confirmed in the May 
2011 Communication, corruption remains 
entrenched and according to indicators the 
situation has become markedly worse in 
Ukraine and Moldova. Perceptions of the 
governments’ ability to tackle corruption 
are also very low, indicating quite meagre 
public confidence in their governments. 
One might conclude then, that ENP has 







CPI Rank out 
of 178
Freedom House
Civil Liberties scale 
of 1-7 (7 = worst)26
World Governance 
Indicators (World Bank) 
2009 (rank 0-100)
Ukraine 2.6 (2005) 
2.2 (2009) 





Voice and Accountability27 
47.4
Rule of Law 26.4








Voice and Accountability 
38.9
Rule of Law 39.2







Voice and Accountability 
7.1
Rule of Law 18.9
Control of Corruption 23.3
Table: Corruption and the Rule of Law
25 Corruption Perceptions Index.  Greece is the lowest scorer of the EU member states at 3.5.
26 Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.
cfm?page=439. 
27 Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  For all data 
see Worldwide Governance Indicators: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp. 




Borders with Russia, 
Belarus, Moldova, 
Romania. Schengen states: 
Hungary, Slovakia, Poland 
MOLDOVA
Borders with Romania, 
Ukraine. Schengen states: 
none (until Romania joins 
Schengen, probably in 
2012)
BELARUS
Borders with Russia, 
Ukraine, Schengen 
states: Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania
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Progress in the Mobility Area
Both Ukraine and Moldova have 
had Visa Facilitation and Readmission 
Agreements with the EU since 2008. In 
October the same year the European 
Commission launched a Visa Dialogue with 
Ukraine which focuses on four thematic 
blocks: document security including 
biometrics, illegal immigration including 
readmission, public order and security, and 
external relations. A similar dialogue began 
with Moldova in 2010.
A tangible sign of success in this sphere 
came in November 2010 when the EU 
offered Ukraine an Action Plan on Visa 
Liberalisation (VL), signaling the start of 
the ‘operational phase’ of the ongoing Visa 
Dialogue. A comparable offer was made to 
Moldova in January 2011. The significance 
of such steps is high. To begin, though they 
do not hold out a clear promise or road 
map to Visa-free travel, it is regarded as a 
long term goal. This commitment from the 
EU seemingly goes a long way in meeting 
the objectives of Ukraine and Moldova 
who have both positioned visa-free travel 
into the EU for their citizens as a priority 
for some time. The Action Plans on VL 
reiterate the main thematic blocks of the 
overall Visa Dialogue, but also bring in new 
components, with a stronger emphasis on 
verification and implementation.30  
The fact that this point has been arrived 
at is positive evidence of a level of success 
in the implementation of the relevant 
portions of the ENP agenda. In particular it 
is recognition of progress in ENP partners’ 
Strategies 
and 
Tendencies   
A foreign policy balancing 
a recalibrated pro-Russian 
tilt alongside a recognition 
of the rewards to be 
reaped from allegiance to 
the West and cooperation 
with the EU. The fading of 
the Orange revolution in 
foreign policy terms has 
seen major steps forwards 
in Ukraine-Russia strategic 
relations. 28 Kiev’s interest 
in the proposed customs 
union with Russia will 
prove to be a potent 
indicator of the Russia / 
EU balance in Ukraine’s 
future foreign policy 
orientation.
The government in 
Chisinau is certainly pro-
European. This is backed 
by a pro-EU population. 
Relations with the EU 
should persist in a 
positive direction as the 
coming year foresees 
progress in negotiations 
on a new Association 
Agreement, DCFTA 
and visa liberalisation. 
Moldova’s relations with 
Romania and Russia have 
entered a quiet phase, 
though as regards the 
latter, deadlock in
Transnistria remains.
Russia is the partner 
for Belarus in political, 
economic and security 
terms.29 It is unlikely 
that this will change in 
the near future, at least 
from the perspective 
of Minsk. The EU 
will have to up the 
ante if any degree of 
change in the regime’s 
openness is to occur. 
EU – Belarus relations 
have again hardened; 
one can expect a more 
punitive stance from the 
EU vis a vis the regime 
in Minsk. 
28 The Ukrainian government agreed to the extension of the agreement with Russia for the stationing of the latter’s 
Black Sea Fleet as a quid pro quo for a renegotiation of key energy agreements.
29 Eastern Partnership Community website: http://www.easternpartnership.org/partner-states/belarus.





efforts at bringing their policies and 
institutions up to EU-standards, especially 
in the area of border management. It is 
also a recognition that the Readmission 
Agreements are working properly. 
Progress in the Visa area will depend 
on further progress in a wide range of 
fields. Crucially, corruption is perhaps 
the biggest and most fundamental hurdle 
standing in the way of progress and full 
implementation. As noted earlier, systemic 
corruption conjoined with weak judiciaries 
does not bode well for the fuller and 
complete adoption of the EU’s requirements 
in this domain. The holding of expelled 
individuals and their correct treatment 
in line with human rights standards and 
document security are particular areas 
which can be vulnerable to corruption and 
mishandling. Fuller progress by neighbours 
and the EU’s will to respond positively will 
also be shaped by better reform in the area 
of migration management.31
Though processes remain incomplete, 
national Border Guard Agencies are being 
reformed into professional agencies in line 
with EU standards. As from 2008 Ukrainian 
personnel were recruited through entry 
examinations and were given proper 
contracts and training, which was not 
necessarily the case before. Moreover, 
education and training systems were 
reformed rendering them compliant with 
EU core curriculum for border guard 
services. 
In the case of Belarus, the most 
impressive area of activity has been in 
the Border Guard’s adoption of new 
technologies for border management and 
surveillance, rather than reform of the 
culture of the organization itself, as seems 
to be the case for Ukraine and Moldova. 
Vital to note is the fact that the military 
style structure and culture of the Belarusian 
border guard service has aided the efficient 
implementation of EU-funded projects in 
this area. 
This article sees that the Visa Facilitation 
and Readmission Agreements with Ukraine 
and Moldova seem to be working and that 
under the new Visa Liberalisation Action 
Plans further progress can be made this 
year. Strides have also been taken forwards 
with the development of the EU Visa Code, 
which is seen to be having some positive 
practical effects, such as more fee waivers, 
shorter queues at national consulates in 
ENP states and degrees of streamlining 
and transparency in the visa-application 
procedure for ENP citizens. At the same 
time, the EU Visa Code isn’t yet bringing 
in the level of standardization ultimately 
aspired too. National differences still 
persist, for example the new EU member 
states tend to issue the most short stay 
Schengen visas for ENP-East citizens. All 
in all, then, old patterns of visa issuance 
tend to persist. The intended effects of the 
Code and member states capacities to live 
up to it will take more time, consequently 
‘visa shopping’ still occurs.  The Common 
Visa Application Centre in Chisinau, 
opened in 2007 issues Schengen (short-
stay) visas for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Sweden and Switzerland and is generally 
viewed as a successful model to emulate 
and to properly consolidate the EU Visa 
Code.32 
31 European Court of Auditors’, ‘The Effectiveness of EU Support in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine’, Special Report 9, 2008, available at:  http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/2362310.PDF. 
32 The first EU “Common Visa Application Centre” opens in Moldova’, IP/07/561, 25 April 2007, available at: www.europa.
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/561&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
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The Overall Score Sheet and 
Recommendations
The implementation of ENP in the East 
has had patchy effects. The condition of 
democracy is a major factor affecting the 
implementation of ENP and its overall 
success. Importantly, the persistence of 
corruption, weak legal and regulatory 
systems stymies the efficient implementation 
and monitoring of EU-sponsored projects. 
Coupled with this, the lack of an ENP end-
game arguably undermines the effectiveness 
and reception of ENP in the region; without 
strong enough incentives, the types of 
painful and costly reforms that Central 
European states had to go through on route 
to EU membership may not be warranted as 
worth it in the eyes of elites in ENP partner 
states. Such an argument also rings true 
in the case of mobility. Though generally 
speaking it is now easier and cheaper for 
many Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens to 
acquire visas to travel to the EU it is still less 
complicated and less expensive for them to 
travel to Russia. Crucially, much of the EU’s 
credibility in the region and effectiveness 
of ENP rests on a better offer from the EU 
for the mobility of ENP citizens through the 
softening of the Schengen border.  
Reflecting upon the recent 
Communication and the analysis presented 
above, the following recommendations are 
presented.
Tackling Corruption
Since good governance and the rule 
of law are central elements to the ENP 
mission, it stands to reason that the EU 
should develop more innovative ways 
of helping states to tackle corruption. Of 
course this is not at all an easy task, not 
least because governments themselves are 
sources of corrupt practices or are strongly 
susceptible to its effects. ENP governments 
often have no vested interests in tackling 
corruption. Corrupt practices are often 
viewed in the neighbouring states as just the 
normal and regular ways of doing things, 
thus any changes to higher standards would 
require a thorough change of culture.  The 
EU needs to be more exacting in spelling 
out what it expects of the neighbours in the 
area of tackling corruption, emphasising 
small steps rather than preaching about the 
superiority of EU standards. At the same 
time member states need to be realistic 
about how much change can be expected 
in the short to medium term. EU efforts 
should concentrate on building up national 
administrations from the bottom-up, via the 
training of young civil servants, for example. 
Organising ENP
A substantial part of the current debate 
on ENP concerns the balance between 
the South and the East. Though all eyes 
are focused on the South at present, 
democratic backsliding in Ukraine and 
the entrenchment of authoritarianism 
in Belarus shows that there is much 
unfinished work to be done in the East. 
As already noted the implementation of 
ENP over the past five years or so has 
issued patchy results all in all. A standard 
answer to this is that greater differentiation 
should be injected into ENP based on a 
greater division between the Southern and 
Eastern portions of the neighbourhood. 
However, this paper argues that a profound 
geographical split would serve to severe 
the EU as a whole from neighbourhood 
policy and as a consequence EU policy 
towards the neighbours would become 
parochial and subject to the often very 
specific preferences of sub-sets of member 
states with their geopolitical interests. In 
short, the wider strategic goals set out in 
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ENP (however imperfect and ill-defined 
they might sometimes be) would be lost. 
Where ENP needs to remain joined up 
is on tackling the ‘big issues’, namely 
democratization; installation of the rule of 
law; good governance, tackling corruption 
and so on. Coherent definitions, firm 
principles backed by funding dedicated to 
specific priorities within this area, which can 
be monitored and verified over time form 
a sounds basis. Expanding the basis of the 
Governance Facility could be considered in 
this respect. 
The key recommendation here is based 
on the idea that little can be gained by 
making such a clear and decisive division 
on a South/East axis. Instead, differentiation 
should be more graduated and be based on 
concepts of (a) regions and (b) on measures 
of performance.
(a) The UfM and the EaP have already 
brought elements of regionalism to 
ENP. New arrangements within ENP 
such as these and ‘Macro-Region’ 
initiatives such as the Baltic Sea Strategy 
or the new Danube Strategy can play 
a complimentary role within and in 
service of the ENP. However, their 
emphasis and role should not lie in the 
creation of new institutional frameworks 
or secretariats that might overlap with 
existing structures, but should be 
project-oriented. The EaP provides 
a useful example with its emphasis 
upon regionally relevant Flagship 
Initiatives, such as those on energy 
security and border management. 
The key idea stressed here is that of 
relevance. Infrastructure, transport and 
environmental projects are the kind of 
areas where regionally focused projects 
within ENP could find currency in the 
South, where the UfM structure does 
not seem to deliver.  
(b) Further on the issue of 
differentiation is the notion of creating 
mechanisms and opportunities for 
ENP states to take an accelerated rate 
of cooperation with the EU if they 
demonstrate a capacity to move along the 
reform track (‘more for more’). The EU’s 
offer, it seems, has not been strong enough 
to prize Belarus out of its isolationism and 
neither has it been entirely successful at 
mobilizing a generation of Ukrainian elites 
to stay on a Westwards course. Moldova 
presents a less negative picture, though 
at the same time Brussels should not 
take things for granted. More responsive 
mechanisms need to be in place to take 
forwards or pull back on the EU’s offer 
in response to neighbours’ performance. 
Enhanced mobility options, in the 
direction of more fee waivers, quicker 
application procedures etc. can play a 
crucial role here. Swifter movement and 
greater generosity in the DCFTAs is also 
an imperative in this regard.
Funding Regional Endeavors
ENPI funding is overwhelmingly dished 
out on a country by country basis. This 
national focus mirrors the bilateral Action 
Plan-based design of ENP and should 
not be altered fundamentally. However, 
a bolstering of monies dedicated to 
multilateral/regional endeavors could help 
partner states deliver in such key areas as 
infrastructure, regional transport networks, 
cross border activities, border management 
and the like – all of which deliver security 
for both the EU and ENP states. At the 
moment one of the consequences of the 
design of ENP/ENPI is that peripheral areas 
of countries, and often border regions, 
are overlooked. Second, there are many 
missed opportunities for interregional 
cooperation. Where are the incentives for 
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mutual learning and sharing of information 
between Ukraine and Moldova on the 
implementation of their Action Plans, for 
example?  A further comment on this issue 
relates to the particular case of Belarus. Due 
to its position as an ENP-outlier Belarus’ 
funding is small compared to its neighbours 
and is aimed at socio-economic well-
being and prioritises regional and local 
authorities. Belarus could gain significantly 
if a bigger proportion of ENPI funds were 
dedicated to regional/multilateral projects, 
which would boost security and sideline 
the central government – a key objective of 
EU policy. 
These recommendations notwithstanding, 
it is the bilateral dimension of ENP/EaP 
which is most important for the Eastern 
neighbours and has the better potential 
to deliver results. The EaP’s multilateral 
projects have the danger of delivering 
sub-optimal results since coordination and 
approval is required by all participating EaP 
states and it can not be guaranteed that all 
states will support all initiatives all the time. 
Crucially, the appetite for multilateral and 
regionally-based projects is not so high for 
Ukraine and Moldova, which as aspiring 
members seek to cut their own teeth with 
the EU. The task in hand therefore is to 
keep and strengthen the bilateral channels 
of ENP/EaP and at the same time think 
about optimizing a regional approach of 
relevance to the neighbours and to develop 
it in full consultation with them. 
Belarus
The EU should be bolder vis-à-vis 
Belarus. There has long been talk about 
a ‘shadow’ ENP Action Plan and the time 
might be right for bringing such a plan into 
the light, to spell out more courageously 
what the EU can deliver to ordinary citizens. 
Of course real change in Belarus will only 
come about once the current regime is 
either driven out or demises. All the EU 
can do in the meantime is to continue to 
press on with its policies of sanctions and 
visa bans vis a vis the government and at 
the same time support forces for democracy 
and civil society. With a view to enhancing 
the mobility of Belarusian citizens and 
of giving them a positive view of the EU, 
easier and cheaper visa acquisition, as well 
as more scholarships could be a priority. 
A change in this respect could prove to be 
an important stimulus to enhance the EU’s 
mission in this country. 
Softening Schengen
It was argued earlier that a commitment 
from the EU in terms of Visa Facilitation/
Liberalization has become a key test of the 
EU’s resolve towards the Eastern neighbours. 
At present the EU’s borders remain hard-
edged, but at the same time are perforated 
by the effects of visa facilitation agreements 
and by local border traffic zones (LBTZ), for 
example. This is not a bad start, but there is 
scope for more:
(a) Local Border Traffic Zones: In time 
the EU could extend the scope of LBTZs. 
At present such zones cover up to 30kms 
on either side of a border and are strictly 
implemented. However traffic is very 
much one-way. In one of the Polish-
Ukrainian LBTZs mobility basically 
consists of local Ukrainian nationals 
crossing the border once a day selling 
two packets of cigarettes bought in 
Ukraine and then heading back having 
made a small income for a days work. 
In its current design it seems that LBTZs 
are not meeting their potential. Actively 
broadening the border zone, to say 
50kms and providing special privileges 
for local SMEs to do business, as well as 
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incentives for student exchange LBTZs 
could play a security-building role based 
on socio-economic objectives across 
strategically important border areas. 
(b) EU Visa Policy Developments: 
These have led to steady positive 
changes in the facilitation of the issuing 
of Schengen Visas, in terms of easier 
and swifter delivery of results and easier 
and cheaper application procedures, 
as noted above. More multiple entry 
visas are being delivered for a basis of 
six months or more, and queuing times 
have been reduced and become more 
uniform across consulates to some 
degree. More fee waivers are being 
issued, but at the same time more 
people are opting to use external service 
providers to ensure swifter visa delivery, 
at a cost. Despite this, the perception 
remains that the EU practices a very 
restrictive Visa policy, which surely 
impinges upon the EU’s notional role 
as a normative power. Based on this 
conclusion this paper recommends that 
the EU presses fast forwards with its 
efforts at visa liberalization with Ukraine 
and Moldova and as noted above, holds 
out the option for Belarusian citizens too. 
This need not be pursued in a grandiose 
way, but with clearly demarcated steps, 
such as issuing more multiple entry long 
term visas, establishing more common 
application centres, or at least to think 
more creatively in this respect, also 
taking on board the need to address 
the lack of consular services in towns 
beyond national capitals and other 
major cities. Properly standardizing 
lists of required documents is also a 
must, since at present particularly on 
the questions of means to return home, 
the list of documents required is rather 
unspecific or open to interpretation.
(c) EU Migration Policy needs 
to figure more centrally in the 
development of ENP. There are a 
number of issues relevant here. The first 
is that EU member states need to launch 
a more rationale discussion about their 
immigration needs and to develop a 
European strategy on migration which 
does not cloak the issue as a security 
threat. In this way, the enlargement of 
mobility options for ENP citizens could 
proceed in a more constructive and 
informed way. Of course the ENP menu 
also has to address more squarely the 
root causes of migration from ENP states; 
people leave a country due to poverty 
or because of conflict or human rights 
abuses. To address these, the EU needs 
to enact a fairer trade policy, including 
a reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, and give more development 
assistance.
21
APPRAISING THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: BACKGROUND, IMPLEMENTATION 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS




11.2 Billion Euros33 - the ‘financial envelope’ 
of ENPI





2.51 Billion Euros 
Ukraine: 494 Million Euros34 (2007-2010)
Priority areas democratic development 
and good governance 148.2 million euros 
(30%); regulatory reforms and administrative 
capacity building 148.2 million euros (30%); 
infrastructure 197.6 million euros (40%) 
MOLDOVA 209.7 Million Euros35(2007-2010) 
Democratic Development and Good 
Governance 52.4 – 73.4 Million Euros (25-
35%). Regulatory reforms and administrative 
capacity building 31.5 – 41.9 Million Euros (15-
20%) Poverty reduction and economic growth 
83.9-125.8 million euros (40-60%) 
BELARUS (2007-2011)
An allocation of 20 Million Euros was originally 
set for 2007-2010, after advances in EU-Belarus 
relations in 2008 more funds were earmarked to 
bring the figure up to 46.7 Million Euros (which 
includes funds from the EaP Comprehensive 
Institution Building fund).36 Social and 
Economic Development (70%) Democratic 







programmes in six 
ENP states, plus 
Russia.
33 Regulation (EC) no 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down 
general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, available at:  http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:310:0001:0014:EN:PDF. 
34 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf. 
35 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Republic of Moldova National Indicative Programme 2007-
2010, available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_moldova_en.pdf. 
36 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Belarus Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National 
Indicative Programme 2007-2011.
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includes support for 
cooperation between 
ENP countries and 
EU states and ENP 




systems with the 








423 Million Euros Supporting 
cooperation between 
local and regional 
authorities on both 










700 Million Euros38 
Additional funds of 350 Million Euros taken 
from the budget reserve. Plus 250 Million 
Euros advanced 
GF funds awarded to 
those ENP states as 
reward for advances 
in the area of good 
governance (only 
for neighbours with 
actual Action Plans, 
thus Belarus is 
excluded).
In 2008 37.23 
million Euros of 
NIF monies were 
used to co-fund 
eight projects 
in the Eastern 
neighbourhood. 
36 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Belarus Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National 
Indicative Programme 2007-2011.
37 Of that 450 Million Euros reserved for the Neighbourhood Investment Facility.
38 Added to this are contributions to the pot from member states.
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